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BUYER'S RIGHT OF REJECTION
A STUDY IN THE IMPACT OF CODIFICATION UPON A COMMERCIAL
PROBLEM
By JOHN HONNOLD t
Preparation of a Revised Sales Act calls for examination of a
problem which has vexed courts and legislative draftsmen since the
beginning of sales law. This problem, which merchants face daily,
arises whenever the seller's tender of performance deviates in some
respect from his contract obligation. Does the buyer in every such
case have the right to reject the goods, or are there instances in which
he may be under a duty to accept subject to compensation for the
defect in the seller's performance? 1
The question is made acute by wide swings in commodity prices
between the making of the contract and the time for performance.
When the market drops, the buyer views the contract with regret and
tends to look with a sharp eye to every detail of the seller's per-
formance. In this setting, a right of rejection is of crucial importance
to both parties, since it throws upon the seller the burden of the mar-
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1. Scrutton, L. J. in Meyer, Ltd. v. Kivisto, 142 L. T. 480, 481 (C. A. 1930)
summed up a lifetime of experience; ". . . As far as I remember, in every com-
mercial litigation this question of whether you can reject or have a claim for damages
has constantly been raised in various kinds of trade, and under various kinds of con-
tracts, and, I daresay, will continue to be raised for centuries yet to come." See
Burdick, Conditions and Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 1 COL. L. REv. 71 (1901);
Note, 33 COL. L. REv. 1021 (1933) ; Note, 5 MINN. L. REV. 216 (1921) ; 48 CoL L.
REv. 161 (1948); 1 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 178 et seq. (3d ed. 1948) (herein cited
WILLISTON, SALES). On the Revised Sales Act see note 66 infra.
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ket decline which, in normal course, the making of the contract placed
upon the buyer.'
The scope of the right of rejection has significance beyond the
solution of current sales controversies. Counselors, warned of pit-
falls in the present law, may be well advised to review their clients'
sales contracts. In addition, examination of this problem will provide
a basis for evaluating proposed changes in the rules now in force
under the Uniform Sales Act.
ORIGINS OF THE PRESENT RULES
The roots of the right to reject for breach of contract run deep,
and follow a tortuous path. The development of early contract law
need not now be traced in detail.' But it is relevant to recall that early
decisions did not relieve one of the duty of performing his promise
in spite of a breach by the other party unless the two parts of the
contract were linked by some verbal formula; 4 that this literal ap-
proach was discarded by Lord Mansfield in Kingston v. Preston; 5 and
that further attempts to solve the problem by rigid rules have been
widely rejected in favor of a more flexible approach depending in each
case upon the seriousness of the breach and the harshness of relieving
a party of his contract obligation.6
This line of development, however, has not been followed in the
law of sales. Arrested development may be traced in part to early
2. See Llewellyn, What Price Contract?, 40 YALE L. J. 704, 722 (1931); Arcos,
Ltd. v. Ronaasen and Son, [1933] A. C. 470, 480 (H. L.).
This article is concerned with the buyer's right to reject without incurring any
liability to the seller. If the buyer's rejection is wrongful, the seller is given legal
protection against a price decline by an action for damages. UnoRM SALES AcT
§ 64(3). Distinct from the problem now under consideration is the question whether
the buyer has the power, even by a wrongful rejection, to avoid liability for the full
contract price. Cf. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 63.
3. For history of conditions in contracts see: 8 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW 70-88 (2d ed. 1937); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 812-822 (3d -ed.
1936) (herein cited WILLISTON, CONTRACTS). For analyses of the problem, see
Corbin, Conditions in the Law of Contract, SELECTED READINGS IN THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS 871 (1931) first published in 28 YALE L. J. 739 (1919) ; Patterson, Constructive
Conditions in Contracts, 42 COL. L. REv. 902 (1942).
4. E. g., Anon., Y. B. Trin. 15 Hen. VII, pl. 17 (1500), in which Fineux, C. J.
stated that covenants would be treated as independent unless linked by a phrase such
as "for said cause."
5. Lofft 194, 2 Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K. B. 1773).
6. Sergeant Williams' set of five rules in the note to Pordage v. Cole, 1 Saund.
319, 320, 85 Eng. Rep. 449, 451-3 (1681) is the classic attempt to prescribe rules to
govern the problem of conditions. Sergeant Williams' first rule found its way into
the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, 56 & 57 Vict., c. 71, § 49(2) (hereafter cited as SALE OF
GOODS ACT) and from there into the Uniform Sales Act, Section 63(2). Descendants
of the fifth rule may be found in Section 28 of the Sale of Goods Act and in Section 42
of the Uniform Sales Act.
For the breakdown of these rules see 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 821 et seq., esp.
at p. 2360; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 275, 276 (1942).
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codification in Britain in the Sale of Goods Act, and to the con-
scientious effort of its draftsman to reproduce "as exactly as possible
the existing law." '7 As a result, there was frozen into permanent
form a curious blend of early property and contract principles. On
the one hand, the British Act followed early case-law in curtailing the
right of the buyer to reject "specific goods, the property in which has
passed to the buyer," 8 but balanced this with an equally technical rule
authorizing rejection of goods sold "by description" whenever the
goods failed to correspond with the description.' But the Act also
set forth a third rule, of uncertain scope, that the right of rejection
"depends in each case on the construction of the contract." 10
The treatment of this single problem in the Sale of Goods Act
suffered at the same time from the contrasting evils of technicality and
indefiniteness. Little relationship was apparent between the question
whether goods were "specific" and the appropriateness of the remedy
of rejection.1 On the other hand, the rule that the right of rejection
turns on the "construction of the contract" invited search for an intent
which usually was not expressed, and proved difficult of application.'
The lack of precision was particularly disturbing to Professor
Williston, the draftsman of the Uniform Sales Act. In commenting
on the British statute, Williston concluded that although it enabled
courts to "deal freely with each case as it arises, and to find that words
were 'intended' as a condition whenever circumstances make it
desirable," the loss of predictability from such an approach could not
7. CrAL tms, SALE OF GOODS AcT viii (8th ed. 1920) (Introduction to the First
Edition).
8. SALE OF GOODS ACT § 11 (1) (c). This provision codified the rule of Heyworth
v. Hutchinson, L. R. 2 Q. B. 446 (1867).
9. SALE OF GOODs ACT § 13. For an extreme application of the right of rejection
under this section see Arcos, Ltd. v. Ronaasen and Son, [1933] A. C. 470 (H. L.).
Under the statute, the right of rejection arises from labelling the seller's obligation a
"condition," in contrast to a mere "warranty," which under Section 11(1) (b) gives
rise to a "claim for damages, but not to a right to reject the goods." The implied
obligations under Sction 14 of fitness for purpose and merchantable quality are
labelled "conditions," thereby affording the buyer a right of rejection for their breach.
But cf. id. §§ 12(2), 12(3) (obligations as to "right to sell" and "quiet possession"
termed "warranties").
The foregoing provisions were applied only to England and Ireland; Section
11(2) preserved for Scotland the simpler rule that the buyer may reject goods if the
seller fails to perform "any material part" of his contract.
10. SALE OF GOODS AcT § 11 (1) (b).
11. The distinction between "specific" goods and those purchased "by description"
broke down in Varley v. Whipp, [1900] 1 Q. B. 513 (purchase of specific binder which
buyer had not seen; held a purchase "by description").
12. See Bailhache, J. in Harrison v. Knowles, [1917] 2 K. B. 606, 609-10;
BENJAMIN, SALEs 580 (7th ed. 1931). It seems, however, that part of the confusion
arose from the attempt to borrow the distinction between "condition" and "warranty"
in order to solve the elusive problems arising under the parol evidence rule. E. g.,
see Harrison v. Knowles, mipra.
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be tolerated.3 Consequently, it was decided at this point to abandon
the British pattern; in the words of the draftsman:
".. it is believed that no greater simplification can be made
in the law of sales than to make it of no importance whether an
obligation which forms part of a bargain is collateral or not; and
this simplification is obtained without danger of injustice." 14
The desired simplicity and predictability were sought through
sweeping rules written into the Uniform Sales Act which gave the
buyer the right to refuse to accept goods, or to rescind the contract,
for any "breach of warranty"; " at the same time the definition of
"warranty" was expanded to cover the entire scope of the seller's
obligations relating to the goods. 6 One could hardly ask a more
clearcut rule. If ease in the application of a rule is a correlative of
simplicity in its statement, the task of counselor and judge was indeed
made light. But there remains the question of the extent to which
case-law and business needs have been able to adjust themselves to
this simply stated rule.
CASE-LAW AND BUSINESS PRACTICE
There has now been more than a generation of experience under
the Uniform Sales Act to provide a measure of its impact upon the
problem of rejection. Certainly the Act has served well to end the
attempt to relate this problem to the subtle question of whether the
subject-matter of the contract was "specific," or called for a sale "by
description." 17 In addition, the provisions of the Act have afforded
a basis for strong judicial language rejecting the contention that a
13. 1 WILLisToN, SAX.Ls § 183. But cf. Burdick, Conditions and Warranties in
the Sale of Goods, 1 COL. L. REv. 71, 73 (1901), commending the Sale of Goods Act
for removing "one of the most fruitful sources of confusion in this branch of the law."
14. 1 Wn.rasToN, SALEs § 181.
15. Section 69(1) of the Uniform Sales Act provides: "Where there is a breach
of warranty by the seller, the buyer may, at his election: (a) accept or keep the
goods [and recoup or recover damages, or] ; (b) refuse to accept the goods . . .;
(c) rescind the contract to sell or the sale." In this article, "rejection" refers to
buyer's refusal to accept or to keep tendered goods under either Section 69(1) (c) or
69(1) (d).
16. "Warranty" was defined to include not only the basic implied warranties of
title, merchantability and fitness, but also "any affirmation" and "any promise" relating
to the goods on which the buyer relied. UNIFORM SALEs AcT §§ 12-15. Cf. id.
§ 44 (rejection for deviation in quantity). Contrast the narrow scope of this term in
the British statute, supra note 9.
17. But cf. Forsyth Furniture Lines v. Druckman. 8 F. 2d 212 (4th Cir. 1925);
Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 449, 166 P. 2d 518 (1946). Unaccountably,
the "by description" qualification is preserved in the Uniform Sales Act, Section
15(2) (warranty of merchantable quality) where it continues to be a source of diffi-
culty. See also Sections 11(2), 14.
BUYER'S RIGHT OF REJECTION
buyer should have accepted goods deviating from the contract;' 8
taken at face value these decisions suggest that the problem of rejec-
tion in sales law has been solved.
The results of the cases, however, hardly support this conclusion.
Commencing with the litigation which followed the price collapse after
the first World War, it is possible to detect a slow retreat from an
inflexible rule of rejection. 9 Recently this trend was made explicit
in a decision which barred rejection on the ground that "amelioration
of the strict rule" had occurred which "brings the law of sales in closer
harmony with the law of contracts." 20
The Statute. The language of the Uniform Sales Act has not
proved an impassable barrier to this development. In a number of
cases rejection has been readily found improper on the ground that
the buyer relied on a literal reading of the contract, out of harmony
with the leeway permitted under commercial understanding of its
provisions." Cases of this variety place little strain upon the lan-
guage of the Uniform Sales Act; far from tolerating a breach of the
contract, the court rejects a dictionary-bound reading of its words in
favor of the meaning of the contract to the business men who executed
it.
2 2
Greater difficulty is presented in instances in which the seller's
performance clearly departs from some specification of the contract,
18. In re A. W. Cowen & Bros., 11 F. 2d 692 (2d Cir. 1926); True v. Deeds &
Son, 151 Tenn. 630, 271 S. W. 41 (1925) ; Frankel v. Foreman, 33 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir.
1929) ; see Note, 33 CoL. L. REV. 1021 (1933).
19. Compare Filley v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213 (1885), with Lamborn v. National
Bank of Commerce, 276 U. S. 469 (1928). Cf. Matthew Smith Co. v. Lamborn, 276
Fed. 325 (S. D. N. Y. 1921), aff'd. 10 F. 2d 697 (2d Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 271
U. S. 683, 685, 686 (1926) ; Lamborn v. Blattner, 6 F. 2d 435 (5th Cir. 1925), cert.
denied, 269 U. S. 564 (1925) ; Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp.,
296 Fed. 316 (3rd Cir. 1924); Erie Food Products Co. v. Interocean Mercantile
Corp., 299 Fed. 71 (6th Cir. 1924) ; Moore & Co. v. Mathieu, 13 F. 2d 747 (9th Cir.
1926), cert. denied, 273 U. S. 733 (1926), all cases involving rejection of sugar after
price collapse. See also National Import and Trading Co. v. Bear & Co., 324 Ill.
346, 155 N. E. 343 (1927) (express repudiation of the rule of Bowes v. Shand, 2 A. C.
455 [H. L. 1877], which set the style for the early American cases) ; Wilbur & Sons
v. Lamborn, 276 Pa. 479, 120 Atl. 478 (1923).
20. LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F. 2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947), 48 COL. L. REV. 161
(1948) (deviation from contract as to time of shipment and date of inspection cer-
tificates).
21. Electric Reduction Co. v. Colonial Steel Co., 276 Pa. 181, 120 Atl. 116
(1923) (contract for metal "free from tin"' did not bar small quanitities usual in
trade) ; Alabama Chemical Co. v. International Agricultural Corp., 35 F. 2d 907
(5th Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U. S. 727 (1930) (contract for "bone phosphate of
lime" permitted substitution of some phosphoric acid) ; cf. Mutual Chemical Co. v.
Marden, Orth & Hastings Co., 235 N. Y. 145, 139 N. E. 221 (1923) (excessive
quantity).
22. On applicability of the parol evidence rule to bar commercial understanding
see the opinion of Coleridge, J. in Brown v. Byrne, 3 E. & B. 703, 118 Eng. Rep. 1304
(Q. B. 1854). See also the opinion of Rossman, J. in Hurst v. Lake & Co., 141
Ore. 306, 16 P. 2d 627 (1932) ; 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE: § 2464 (3d ed. 1940).
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but in a trivial or immaterial respect which does not affect the value
of the seller's performance. Is this a "breach of warranty," with the
result that under the Uniform Sales Act the buyer automatically has
the right of rejection?
Two cases carried to the Supreme Court pose the problem. In
the early case of Filley v. Pope 23 a contract for the purchase of Scotch
iron called for shipment from Glasgow as soon as possible. Because
ships were unavailable at Glasgow, the seller speeded delivery by
shipping from Leith. After collapse of the iron market, the buyer
rejected on the ground that the goods had not been sent from the
agreed point of shipment. The trial court instructed the jury that
this reference to the point of shipment was not a material provision
of the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, declaring that "the
court has neither the means, nor the right" to determine why the
parties inserted this provision in the contract.
24
The Court's later decision in Lamborn v. National Bank of Com-
merce 25 presents an interesting contrast. In 1920, after the post-war
price collapse, the buyer's bank refused to honor a letter of credit
on tender of documents covering a shipment of sugar, on the ground
that the seller tendered delivery on a different ship than the one
originally declared. The lower court, on the authority of the Filley
case, refused to consider the materiality of this deviation and sus-
tained the rejection, but the Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four,
reversed on the ground that the seller had complied with the contract.
Even on the assumption that the seller's action was inconsistent
with some term of the contract, there is basis in the Uniform Sales
Act for barring rejection. The statute provides that an affirmation or
promise gives rise to an express warranty only if its natural tendency
"is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and the buyer pur-
chases the goods relying thereon." 26 At this point the Act appears
23. 115 U. S. 213 (1885). This case, decided shortly before the drafting of the
Uniform Sales Act, provides a point of reference for the trend of later decisions.
24. Id. at 220. The court added that the deviation might have affected policies
of insurance, but did not suggest that the possibility was material to the buyer in this
case. The result may have been affected by the difficulty of distinguishing the facts
in the Filley decision from the facts in Norrington v. Wright, 115 U. S. 188 (1885),
another case of iron rejection decided on the same day. But in the Norrngton. case
the seller was slow in delivering in a falling market; this breach was highly significant
to the buyer, since the buyer in turn would need to dispose of the iron before the price
collapse. Cf. Pope v. Allis, 115 U. S. 363 (1885).
25. 276 U. S. 469 (1928).
26. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 12. (Here, and elsewhere unless noted otherwise,
italics are added.) Section 14 provides that in a sale of goods "by description" there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the description. The
reliance requirement of Section 12, while not expressly incorporated into Section 14,
must be implied to avoid incongruity between these two overlapping provisions. The
emphasis on reliance permeates the warranty provision of the Uniform Sales Act.
See id. §§ 12, 15(1), 15(3), 15(4).
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to prescribe a test-reminiscent of the "uncertain" case law which
preceded its adoption-which permits inquiry into the materiality to
the parties of a contract provision. Although it has not often been
expressly invoked,27 the reliance test provides strong statutory support
for a growing number of decisions which have barred rejection based
on an immaterial deviation from the contract.2" Full use of this pro-
vision appears to be consistent with contract principles. A party's re-
liance upon or expectation of performance provides the strongest
support for the enforcement of promises; 29 where there has been no
real impairment of these interests there is little reason to confer upon
the buyer the remedy of rejection.
It is apparent, however, that under the present statute the scope
of the reliance test is limited in one important respect. Although use-
ful in dealing with a deviation in seller's performance which is im-
material to the buyer, it can not apply if the default is of sufficient
import to require an adjustment of the price. Under the statute such
a deviation must be termed a "breach of warranty" for which the
remedies of rejection or damages may be chosen at the election of the
buyer.
As significant as flexible handling of statutory language has been
the development of legal obstacles to rejection not based on express
provisions of the Act. Examples may be found in cases holding that
the buyer may not revest in the seller title to only a part of the goods
covered by the contract.8" Further barriers lie in numerous holdings
that the buyer has "waived" those objections to the seller's perform-
ance which he failed to specify on rejection; on the basis of an exhaus-
27. E. g., Kraig v. Benjamin, 111 Conn. 266, 149 Ati. 687 (1930); Hellman v.
Kirschner, 191 N. Y. Supp. 202 (Sup. Ct. 1921). The reliance test has been most
commonly employed where the buyer inspected the goods at the time of making the
contract; the language of the statute, however, is not limited to this state of facts.
Cf. UNIFoRm SALES Act § 15 (3).
28. Schmoll Fils & Co. v. Agoos Tanning Co., 256 Mass. 195, 152 N. E. 630
(1926) (Karuchi hides to range from 13/20 lbs.; buyer bound to accept range of
12/20 which was commercially indistinguishable). Cf. Holt v. Sims, 94 Minn. 157,
102 N. W. 386 (1905) ; Mathis v. Holland Furnace Co., 109 Utah 449, 166 P. 2d 518
(1946). See also cases cited notes 19, 20 s=Pra.
The decisions have not faced a subtle question of construction under Section 12:
does the reliance test bar rejection based on a clause of the contract on which the
buyer plainly placed some reliance, but only for substantial performance? For ex-
ample, a buyer certainly would place some reliance upon a specification as to time or
quantity, but possibly only for substantial compliance. But to exclude the reliance
test from such cases would deny Section 12 its full force in basing warranty protection
upon the actual expectation of the parties. See notes 26, 29.
29. See Fuller and Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L. J. 52, 373 (1936-7).
30. See Note, 35 CoL. L. REv. 726 (1935). The significance of these cases for
our purposes is not weakened by the fact that in other situations the strong need of
the buyer to avoid the burden of disposing of goods has led to a retreat. E. g.,
Portfolio v. Rubin, 233 N. Y. 439, 135 N. E. 843 (1922), 38 HARv. L. REv. 988
(1924).
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tive review of the cases one writer found that the motive force behind
these decisions was impatience with rejection in a falling market.3
On occasion, rejection has been denied on the ground, also unsup-
ported by statutory language, that goods had been "made to order." 2
Mercantile practice. Pressure to preserve the obligation of ac-
ceptance has found its most significant outlet in the rules and customs
of merchants. 8 Although often inarticulate, "merchants' law" gov-
erning the obligation of acceptance occasionally comes to light. Arbi-
tration awards in commercial cases show a strong tendency to supplant
rejection with adjustment of the price. 4 More concrete evidence
appears in the detailed regulations which govern trade in the highly
developed commercial markets; these rules reveal a marked tendency,
particularly in the basic raw commodity markets, expressly to limit
the remedy of rejection, and to substitute price adjustment.35
Rules of the market which have been expressly incorporated into
the sales contract are, of course, effective to curtail the right of rejec-
31. Eno, Price Movements and Unstated Objections to the Defective Performance
of Sales Contracts, 44 YALE L. J. 782 (1935). This explanation of the cases was
preliminary to an attack on the doctrine of "waiver." Removal of this safety-valve,
however, would render more urgent the problem of substantial performance.
32. See cases cited note 55 infra.
33. Scrutton, L. J. in Hillas & Co. v. Arcos, Ltd., 36 Com. Cas. 353, 368 (C. A.
1931), drew on his wide acquaintance with business practice: "[The] view [of com-
mercial men] of damages as a sufficient remedy for breach of contract entirely differs
from the law's remedy of rejection."
34. See the significant work in Note, Predictability of Resilt in Commercial
Arbitration, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1022, 1025-6 (1948).
35. E. g., WORTH STREET RULES (April 17, 1941). Detailed provisions applicable
to trade in cotton textiles set forth careful tolerances of quality. For example,
Specifications F. F. (Effective January 2, 1936) (p. 10) at numerous points prescribe
tolerances within which "the buyer may claim an allowance in value . . . but may
not reject or cancel because of such deficiency." A default of ten days in delivering
samples beyond the specified date is termed a "substantial breach." Cf. id. Standard
Cotton Textile Salesnote (p. 4) : For deviation outside the specified tolerances, buyer
may reject; if payment by buyer has been in default "over five days," seller may
cancel "upon eight days registered mail notice of such intention." See also: BASIC
SALES PRovIsIoNs, NATIONAL RETAIL DRY GOODS ASSOCIATION AND APPAREL INDUS-
TRIES INTER-AssOcIATION Com0niTEE (January 1948) Clause 3 (return only for non-
conformity with "material provision"; seller may replace returned merchandise within
5 days after last permissible delivery date) ; RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD
OF TRADE OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO (Dec. 1, 1947) : Rules 83, 282, 341, 517, 913.
(Unless otherwise specified, sellers may deliver certain grades of grain other than
those specified in the contract, subject to price adjustment.) See also: BY-LAWS OF
THE COMmODITY EXCHANGE, INC., OF NEW YORK, Chap. X, § 1009; Rule 10; RULES
OF THE NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE (as amended Jan. 3, 1924) Rule 8, § 14
(leeway as to time for presentation of documents) ; Rule 9, §§ 1, 2, 3, 6, 8, 13, 15,
17, 23, 25, et seq. (allowances for deficiency in quality) ; RULEs OF THE NEW YORK
PRODUCE EXCHANGE (Vegetable Oils; March 7, 1935) General Rules 7 & 11
(quantity) ; Rejection Rules 4 (further tender permitted within five days after rejec-
tion) ; Quality Rules 7, 9, 12 et seq. (allowances for a quality deficiency) ; CLEARING
HOUSE RULES, NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (April 10, 1933) Rules 64, 66C,
81A-par. 5, 86-par. 5, 6, 8, 9; RULES RELATING TO CONTRACTS AND DELIVERIES, NEW
OR.EANS COTTON EXCHANGE (Amended June 4, 1941) Rule 1, § 2; Rule 12, §§ 2,
4, 5; NEW YORK PRODUCE EXCHANGE, RULES REGULATING TRANSACTIONS IN COT-
TONSEED OIL FUTURES CONTRACTS RULES 75, 90 (Dec. 4, 1947); RULES OF THE
CHICAGO MERCANTILE EXCHANGE §§ 815, 1205, 1307, 1605, 1705, 1805, 1905 (September
3, 1946).
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tion.3" But the Act provides that its rules yield not only to agreement
but also to "custom"; " by this route the inarticulate habits of the
market may be given legal effect. Under the promptings of lawyers
sensitive to commercial practice, courts on occasion have barred rejec-
tion which was found to be inconsistent with the manner in which
buyers and sellers in the market customarily adjust deviation from the
contract.3 These cases make a substantial inroad on the rule of
rejection for they provide a basis for requiring a buyer to accept even
though there has occurred a "breach of warranty" which would oc-
casion adjustment of the price.
Decisions which supplant the remedies of the Act with new
standards derived from the market place stand on one of the frontiers
of sales law. One of the questions yet to be answered is the degree of
firmness with which the custom must be rooted in commercial practice.
It is often said that for judicial recognition a custom must be "ancient"
and "universal." 3' But the sales cases have not always been bound
by these narrow formulas, and there has recently arisen some slight
support for the suggestion that rejection may be barred if inconsistent
with a habit of acceptance in normal times, in spite of evidence of
contrary action on market collapse.4" The lack of fuller development in
See Regulations for Enforcement of Perishable Agricultural Comnwdities Act
8 46, 24(1), (s), 7 CODE FED. REGS., Ch. I, Pt. 46 (1938) pursuant to the Perishable
Agricultural Commodities Act, 46 STAT. 531 (1930), as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 499(f)
(1940) (official definitions for trade terms "f. o. b. acceptance" and "rolling accept-
ance" which substitute damages for rejection). For application of such provisions see
LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F. 2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947); Gillarde Co. v. Martinelli
& Co., 168 F. 2d (1st Cir. 1948). See also: NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE
BOARD, INDUSTRY'S TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SALE 23 (1948).
36. Cf. Pottash v, Herman Reach & Co., 272 Fed. 658 (3d Cir. 1921) ; Cisler v.
Ray, 213 Cal. 620, 2 P. 2d 987 (1931), 79 A. L. R. 592 (1932).
37. Section 71 of the Uniform Sales Act provides that "any right, duty, or lia-
bility" may be varied by "express agreement or by the course of dealing between the
parties, or by custom, if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract or
the sale." Cf. SALE OF GOODS AcT § 55.
38. Dixon, Irmaos and Cia. v. Chase National Bank, 144 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944)
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 850 (1945) (incomplete documents) ; Burton v. Jennings, 185
Fed. 382 (2d Cir. 1911) (custom of lumber trade to take up to 11%5 of culls at two-
thirds price) ; Mutual Chemical Co. v. Marden, 235 N. Y. 145, 139 N. E. 221 (1923)
(excess quantity); Schipper v. Milton, 51 App. Div. 522, 64 N. Y. Supp. 935 (1st
Dept. 1900), aff'd. stub nom., Smith v. Milton, 169 N. Y. 583, 62 N. E. 1100 (1901)
(custom of hemp trade to accept less price adjustment). See also cases cited supra
note 21. On the requirement of reasonableness see Learned Hand, J., in Kungling
Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter & Carpenter, 299 Fed. 991, 994 (S. D. N. Y. 1924).
39. See, e. g., Federal Reserve Bank v. Malloy, 264 U. S. 160, 170 (1924) ; In re
A. W. Cowen Bros., 11 F. 2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1926); 2 WIu.IsToN, CONTRACTS
§§ 657 et seq. Compare the narrow scope for custom suggested in POLLOCK, FIRST
BOOK OF JURISPRUDENCE 281 et seq. (4th ed. 1918) (following Blackstone) with
ALLEN, LAw IN THE MAKING 87 et seq. (2d ed. 1930). On the impact of statutes on
further growth of the law through custom see CARnozo, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 59 (1921).
40. Dixon, Irmaos & Cia v. Chase National Bank, 144 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944),
cert. denied, 324 U. S. 850 (1945). A witness for defendant naively testified that
acceptance was the practice until the occupation of Belgium in 1940 rendered such
action unprofitable. See also conflicting evidence of custom in cases cited note 38
sitpra.
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the cases suggests that attorneys have not fully exhausted the pos-
sibilities of custom as a source of sales law. From the inception of
commercial law, reference to the customs of business men has been
employed to bring the law of the courts into closer relationship with
business needs. Continued access to this source of law is made pos-
sible by express provision in the Uniform Sales Act.
A sound solution to the problem of the duty of acceptance ap-
parently does not lie on the surface of any simple statutory formula.
The questions of construction still open under the present statute and
the necessity to consider a reformulation of sales rules in the proposed
Revised Sales Act require an analysis of the conflicting interests which
are at stake.
CONFLICTING INTERESTS
At the threshold of any inquiry into the interests of buyer and
seller in the choice of remedy for breach of warranty, it is necessary
to deal with the suggestion that the right of rejection may summarily
be deduced from the nature of the buyer's promise. It has been sug-
gested by eminent authority that if tendered goods fail to correspond
with the contract description it necessarily follows that the buyer may
refuse to take them, "for the goods are not within the terms of his
promise to buy." 41
This deduction from the nature of the "promise to buy" is not
conclusive since it fails to draw a necessary distinction between the
buyer's promise to pay the full contract price and his promise to accept
the goods. There is little difficulty in concluding that the buyer's
promise to pay the full price should not be enforced if the seller has
failed to tender the agreed exchange.4 ' But to go further requires an
assumption that the parties to sales contracts in each case agree that
an appropriate remedy for any contract deviation shall be rejection,
rather than adjustment of the price. Such an intent is actually
expressed in some instances, and in many others is a reasonable con-
struction of the expectation of the parties. It plainly is a fiction, how-
ever, to assume that in all sales contracts the parties have actually
considered and agreed upon rejection for every breach. Certainly, this
assumption is belied by mercantile practice in many areas.4 3 In addi-
tion, it runs afoul of the decisions; if valid, it would apply with equal
41. 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 225. Compare the "by description" rule of the British
Act. SALE OF GOODS Act § 13, supra note 11.
42. It is not necessary for present purposes to decide whether relieving the buyer
of his promise to pay the full price is based upon agreement or upon considerations
of fairness. In either event, the buyer has the right to recover or recoup from the
seller damages for breach of warranty. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 69(1) (a), (b).
43. See note 35 supra.
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force throughout the law of contracts, and is contradicted by all the
cases which in that field refuse to hold that perfect performance by one
party is a condition of the other's duty of counter-performance.
44
The appeal of this fiction in the law of sales probably arises from
the fact that many sales transactions call for a simultaneous exchange
of goods for the price. As the development of the doctrine of con-
ditions in contracts illustrates, one of the powerful influences towards
holding full performance by one party to be a condition of the other
party's duty of counter-performance has been a policy against forcing
an extension of credit to the defaulting party.4" In sales transactions
which call for full cash payment in exchange for the delivery of goods
or documents, there are compelling reasons for the remedy of rejection
whenever the value of seller's tendered performance falls short of the
contract price. The buyer's right at a later date to recover damages
is a lame answer to his need for protection from the seller's breach,
since it forces on him the risk of impairment of the seller's credit, as
well as the burden of instituting and prosecuting legal action.
The typical commercial situation calling for simultaneous ex-
change of the goods for full cash payment is the familiar transaction
in which the buyer or his bank have agreed to honor a draft for the
price in exchange for the surrender of a bill of lading covering the
goods. Observers have already noted the broad scope which courts
have given to rejection in "overseas" shipments, and it has been sup-
posed that this derives from mercantile custom calling for strict per-
formance in "documentary" transactions.4" This explanation coin-
cides with the results of a substantial number of the cases, but it is
44. Cf. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTs §§ 825-857. There is surprising contrast between
Professor Williston's handling of the problem of conditions in the treatise on contracts
and in the treatise on sales. See note 41 supra.
The classic statement by Holmes bears repetition here: "You can always imply
a condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of some belief as
to the practice of a community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy,
or, in short, because of some attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact
quantitative measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical con-
clusions." Holmes, The Path of the Law, COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS 167, 181 (1921).
45. See Patterson, Constructive Conditions in Contracts, 42 COL. L. REv. 902, 909
(1942), for an illuminating analysis of this problem in the light of the facts of
Kingston v. Preston, Lofft 194, 2 Doug. 689, 99 Eng. Rep. 437 (K. B. 1773). Cf.
UNrFoRM SALES AcT § 42 (delivery and payment concurrent unless otherwise agreed).
46. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES 500 (1930);
Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 COL. L. REv. 699, 730, 731 (1936);
cf. REvISED SALES AcT § 101 (2), discussed infra text at note 79.
An otherwise trivial defect in documents may have significance to the buyer if
he has contracted to resell the documents in the terms of the original contract, and
the deviation raises doubts as to their acceptability to the second buyer. See Hanson
v. Hamel and Horley, Ltd., [1922] 2 A. C. 36, 46; Finlay and Co. v. Kwik Hoo Tong
Handel Maatschappij, [1928] 2 K. B. 604. The possibility of a bank's liability to its
principal for improper acceptance provides a comparable reason for strictness in
transactions involving letters of credit. Cf. International Banking Corp. v. Irving
Nat. Bank, 283 Fed. 103 (2d Cir. 1922). But cf. Laudisi v. American Exch. Nat.
Bank, 239 N. Y. 234, 146 N. E. 347 (1924).
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submitted that the significant reason probably lies deeper, in the
hazards involved in securing redress after full cash payment.
It is important to get at the root of the reason for this rule. If
the dominant policy justifying rejection is avoidance of extension of
credit for a refund, the same strict rule should apply to domestic cash
transactions which do not employ documents. On the other hand,
the strict rule should not apply to the "documentary" transaction
where credit extension is negligible, as in instances where the devia-
tion does not impair the full value of seller's performance or is over-
come by an adjustment of the demanded price or by adequate in-
demnity. The point is neatly illustrated by the facts in Dixon, Irmaos
& Cia v. Chase National Bank.4" The contract called for the buyer's
bank to honor a draft on presentation of a "full set" of documents.
The seller tendered only one set of bills of lading, but coupled the
tender with a bond of indemnity against loss from the missing docu-
ments. Rejection was held inconsistent with mercantile custom and
therefore improper; it is also evident that the bond of indemnity
avoided the hazard of advance cash payment which otherwise would
provide strong grounds for rejection.4"
The buyer's interest in avoiding an extension of credit to a de-
faulting seller does not, of course, apply to the frequent transaction
allowing the buyer to pay the seller after delivery, since the buyer
may deduct from the price any deficiency in the value of the seller's
performance.49 Does the buyer in a credit transaction have a sig-
nificant interest in rejection, as opposed to recoupment? In many
instances it is possible to isolate a second strong interest in rejection.
This second consideration stems from the fact that rejection has one
of the virtues of a "specific" remedy, such as replevin and specific
relief in equity, since it avoids the necessity of submitting the extent
of damage to negotiation with the adverse party and, in event of dis-
pute, to measurement by a trier of fact." The interest in avoiding an
47. 144 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S. 850 (1945).
48. See also LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F. 2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947) (defect in
documents of no pecuniary significance to buyer) ; Mutual Chemical Co. v. Marden,
Orth & Hastings, 235 N. Y. 145, 139 N. E. 221 (1923) (seller offered adjustment for
excessive quantity; reliance on custom). The willingness of some equity courts to
grant specific performance although the plaintiff may have been in default may, in
part, be explained by the lack of credit strain; the court there supervises a simultaneous
exchange after adjustment of the price to cover the deficiency.
49. UNIFORM SALES Acv §§ 49, 69(1) (a). For data showing the overwhelming
proportion of sales made on credit see CLARK & CLARK, PRINCIPLES OF MARKETING
491 (3d ed. 1947). Transactions calling for the acceptance of a negotiable time draft
must be classed for present purposes with cash payment, because of the possibility of
negotiation to a holder in due course who would not be subject to recoupment based
on seller's breach of warranty.
50. Rejection, of course, is not always a complete remedy, as where the market
price has risen or the buyer is otherwise damaged by seller's failure to supply goods
needed by the buyer. But in each case rejection avoids the problem of measuring the
extent of the deficiency in seller's performance.
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uncertain measurement of damages is a traditional basis for the
remedy of specific performance; in many sales transactions it also
provides a strong reason for affording the buyer the specific remedy
of rejection.
The buyer's need for rejection rather than adjustment of the price
is likely to be strongest when goods have been purchased for use rather
than resale. In such a case, the extent to which a defect in quality
impairs the value of the goods to the buyer may be difficult and ex-
pensive to establish. Resale by the buyer cannot always be relied
upon to provide a certain measurement of his damage because of the
possibility of dispute over the question whether the second sale estab-
lished the full value of the commodity, and the difficulty of showing
the extent of the burden which the resale placed upon the buyer.51
On the other hand, rejection is least needed if the buyer is a merchant
who has purchased for resale, standards of quality are well under-
stood and reflected in a current market price, and there is a live
market for the goods to which the buyer has ready access. These
factors are present in a pronounced degree in trading in the basic raw
and semi-fabricated commodities. It is here that we have seen a
strong trend in commercial practice towards price adjustment rather
than rejection.52 There is likewise some response by the cases to the
lighter need for rejection when the extent of the buyer's damage may
readily be ascertained.53 Neither the problem of credit extension nor
an uncertain measure of damages arises where the deviation in
seller's performance does not detract from its full expected value; in
this context rejection is least needed, and encounters the greatest
hazards in the cases.54
The foregoing discussion has centered on the interests of the
buyer. Does the seller have any interest in acceptance worthy of
judicial concern? Examples appear when the seller has made a heavy
51. UNIFORf SALES Acer § 69(7) (buyer's damage the difference between ".
the value of the goods at the time of delivery to the buyer and the value they would
have had if they had answered to the warranty"). Under this provision the resale
provides strong evidence of "value," but does not fix the measure of damages. 3 WiL-
LISTrON, SALES §§ 550a, 582. Contrast UNIFORM SAL.ES AcT §§ 53(l), 60, 69(5)
(resale executing lien) ; REVISED SALES AcT §§107(1), 112(3) (damages may be
fixed by resale).
52. See note 35 supra.
53. In Forsyth Furniture Lines v. Druckman, 8 F. 2d 212, 214 (4th Cir. 1925),
the court, in holding the buyer must accept goods subject to an allowance, included
as a reason "more important, . . . [the extent of seller's default] is one which in
dollars and cents is capable of exact determination." Difficulty in determining ex-
pense to the buyer also may explain the otherwise difficult case of Jackson v. Rotax
Motor and Cycle Co., [1910] 2 K. B. 937 (C. A.).
The availability of skilled arbitration may make more precise the measurement
of a price adjustment. On the greater tendency towards acceptance in this setting,
see note 34 .rpra.
54. See notes 28, 48 supra.
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investment in performance, by special manufacture to buyer's specifica-
tions or by a long and expensive shipment to the buyer which does
not carry the goods in the direction of a normal market. In either
instance if the goods are substantially usable by the buyer, rejection
may effect a loss of resources to the community, and impose a penalty
upon the seller disproportionate to the burden of acceptance. In
this context, courts have not been wholly callous to the seller's
interest."5
The more common instance in which the seller has a strong in-
terest in acceptance arises when there has been a break in the market
between the making of the contract and the date of delivery. Par-
ticularly in contracts for later delivery of raw commodities which are
subject to wide price fluctuations, one of the central objects of the
transaction is the avoidance by the buyer of the risk of a subsequent
price increase, in exchange for which he assumes the risk of a price
decline.5" The function of such contracts in providing for the volun-
tary redistribution of business risks is defeated to the extent that the
transaction may be upset on trivial grounds not related to the sub-
stantial interests of the parties.
But the fact that rejection may prove to be harsh does not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that it is inappropriate. Occasionally
stern remedies are placed in the hands of private litigants as a means
of penalizing and deterring undesirable conduct.5 Therefore it is
appropriate to ask whether a rule authorizing rejection for any devia-
tion from the contract may be desirable on the ground that the threat
55. E. g., Harrild v. Spokane School District, 112 Wash. 266, 192 Pac. 1 (1920)
(special manufacture), Note, 5 MINN. L. REv. 216 (1921), 19 A. L. R. 811 (1922).
Cf. Beck & Pauli Lithographing Co. v. Colorado Milling and Elevator Co., 52 Fed.
700 (8th Cir. 1892) (printing of advertising matter held "work and labor" rather
than "sale") ; Burton v. Jennings, 185 Fed. 382, 385 (2d Cir. 1911) (fact that ship-
ment of lumber required two months' rail journey emphasized; recourse to custom
of trade). But cf. Corbett v. Freedman & Sons, 263 Mass. 391, 161 N. E. 415 (1928);
Anderson Co. v. Tomlinson Chair Mfg. Co., 206 N. Car. 42, 172 S. E. 538 (1934)
Ellison Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Langever, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 50, 113 S. W. 178
(1908).
The analogy to substantial performance in building contracts on which reliance
is sometimes placed is not fully apposite; in sales contracts the buyer may not retain
the goods without liability for the price, less damages. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 44,
63(1), 69(1)(a) & (b).
56. See note 2 stupra. The buyer often may transfer the risk by immediately
contracting to resell. In such a case, after a drop in the market the buyer by rejec-
tion may gain a windfall, since he may be able to meet his obligations by fresh pur-
chases at the new low price. The buyer who has agreed to resell a particular shipment
from the seller stands in a more precarious position. See note 46 supra.
57. See Morris. Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1173 (1931);
Developments in the Law-Dainages, 61 HARv. L. REv. 113, 119 (1947). A punitive
element may be seen in the strong damage rules for defamation and conversion. See
McCORMIcK, DAMAGES 187, 423, 468 (1935). For statutory use of private action to
police undesirable conduct see, e. g., 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. § 15 (1946)
(Clayton Act; treble damages); 52 STAT. 1060 (1938), 29 U. S. C. §201 (1946)
(Fair Labor Standards Act).
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of severe loss from rejection may have a healthy effect on the tone of
sellers' performance throughout the market.
The possible prophylactic affect of a stern rule of rejection can
not, of course, be measured. Certainly, this possibility provides a
basis for caution in limiting the right of rejection. But the suggestion
that the interest in insuring high standards of performance requires
the adoption of an inflexible rule of rejection is belied by merchants'
rules which have tended to substitute acceptance and price adjustment
for rejection. 8 Moreover, in the handling of actual cases, experience
indicates that courts and triers of fact can recognize performance which
is slovenly or designed to take advantage of the difficulty of price
adjustment, where rejection by the buyer should be supported."9
Even if it were conceded that the interests just examined are
relevant from a standpoint of abstract "justice" to the propriety of the
remedy of rejection, the more difficult question remains: is it feasible
to use such delicate tools in deciding actual controversies? It will
be remembered that the drafting of the Uniform Sales Act was in-
fluenced by a distaste for the uncertainty possible under the British
statute with respect to right of rejection. Does the interest in a sharp
and workable rule make it advisable for legislators and courts to hew
to the line, and support the right of rejection for any deviation from
the contract? 60
The question may not be dismissed lightly. A buyer faced with
a shipment needs to know his legal position, for serious loss may fol-
low an improper attempt to reject." The pressure to give him an
easy answer to his problem is strong; one shrinks from the suggestion
that he be forced to ask himself whether a court or jury will decide
that seller's breach was sufficiently material to justify his rejection.
58. See note 35 mupra.
59. Compare the rule that no recovery on the ground of substantial performance
will be allowed for a "wilful" breach, which seems to reach towards the policy of
deterrence. See Corbin, op. cit. mspra note 3, at 891; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§§ 275(e), 357(1) (a) (1932). However, this rule does not provide a solvent for all
cases: in some instances a conscious deviation from some immaterial term of a con-
tract may be consistent with the highest standards of mercantile conduct in order to
speed performance which has encountered difficulty. Cf. Filley v. Pope, note 23 supra.
60. See Pound, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 137-143 (1922),
emphasizing the importance of certainty in rules governing property and "commer-
cial" transactions, as distinguished from rules governing "conduct." Contrast Frank,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND passim, and esp. 207-216 (1936).
61. A cautious seller, aware of the vagaries of litigation, on rejection by the
buyer will reduce his stake in future legal action by resale. But under the present
statute, he may be under no duty to do so on the ground that "title" passed to the
buyer who thereupon became liable for the full price. UNIFORM SALES ACT
§§ 19(4) (2), 46(1), 63(1). And the books are full of cases where the parties, over-
confident of their legal position, litigated the rightfulness of rejection while the goods
were consumed by demurrage or storage. Contrast REVISED SALES AcT §§ 110(1) (a)
("acceptance" rather than "title" the basic test of price liability), 92(1) (limited duty
on buyer to dispose of goods although rejection rightful).
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It is necessary, however, to face the question whether in actual
practice a much greater degree of certainty actually follows from a
rule which is more severe. Experience, it is believed, shows that
this is one of the areas in the law where it is impossible to escape
questions of degree, and that, as Justice Holmes was fond of saying,
any appearance of exactness is an illusion. 2 Lack of precision, as
we have seen, arises from the flexibility inherent in the language used
in sales contracts. 3 Nor would it have been tolerable to draft or
administer the Uniform Sales Act without the qualification that the
buyer must have "relied" upon the promise or representation in ques-
tion, in spite of the elusive factors on which this test necessarily turns.
Moreover, if the buyer's position is based on a technicality and would
cast serious loss upon the seller, a practicing lawyer would tell him
that his rejection, when scrutinized in court, must run the gauntlet,
not only of the rules of law 64 but also of an unfriendly trier of fact
or arbitrator, who in a close case may conclude that seller's perform-
ance complied with the contract.
6 5
Finally, it should be noted that the buyer who honestly is in doubt
as to his right to reject has in many instances a non-hazardous an-
swer: he may accept the goods and recoup from the seller the value
of any deficiency. Only where the demand for full cash outlay creates
a credit risk or where disposition would be burdensome does ac-
ceptance involve substantial hazards; in these instances experience
shows that a court or arbitrator will be sensitive to his need. On
balance, therefore, it appears that any interest in deciding the problem
easily is outweighed by the interest in deciding it well, and that there
is sound policy behind the case-law which has tended to strengthen
the obligation of acceptance. Proposed revision of the statutory law
of sales raises the question whether it is possible to formulate rules
to this end without sacrificing the legitimate interests of the buyer in
full protection against breach of contract.
THaE REVISED SALES ACT
The subtle nature of the problem of rejection is reflected in deli-
cate distinctions and compromises which appear in the Revised Sales
62. See Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U. S. 312, 342 (1921) (dissenting opinion);
HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920). Cf.. CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 161 (1921).
63. See note 21 supra.
64. See notes 30-31 supa, referring to ad hoc principles which have arisen to
curtail rejection.
65. See Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 13-14
(1910); Fuller, Awrican Legal Realism, 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 429, 431 (1934).
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Act.6" Little intimation of delicacy appears on an initial reading of
the Revised Act, for with more than Willistonian severity it lays
down a rule that ". . . if the goods or the tender of delivery fail
in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may . . . reject
the whole." 67 But this language far from expresses the spirit of the
proposed legislation, for at many points other provisions have been
designed to soften its impact.
"Cure". Of the greatest commercial significance is the creation
of legal machinery to enable the seller to "cure" an infirmity in his
performance. The Revised Act provides that in spite of a defective
tender if the seller had "reason to believe" that his performance
"would be acceptable with or without money allowance" he may have
the privilege of a second tender within a "further reasonable time",
which apparently may reach beyond the date specified in the contract.6"
By this device, the Revised Act opens a way for the seller to make
effective delivery without sacrificing those interests which we have
found most strongly support rejection by the buyer. Presumably, a
late tender would not be within a "reasonable" time if the delay sub-
stantially impaired the value of the seller's performance.69 If this is
true, no credit strain with respect to a refund is placed upon the buyer;
and since on the final tender the goods must fully comply with the con-
tract, the buyer is not subjected to the burden involved in measuring
the value of a defect in the goods. A degree of uncertainty, however,
arises with respect to the buyer's choices. In deciding whether he
may reject he must weigh such intangible factors as whether the seller
had "reason to believe" the first tender would be acceptable, and the
length of a further "reasonable" time during which he must await
a second tender. Nevertheless, at this point the draftsmen of the Re-
vised Act have cast their lot on the side of strengthening the obliga-
66. The Uniform Revised Sales Act comprises Article II of the proposed Com-
mercial Code which is being prepared through the joint sponsorship of the American
Law Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, under the direction of
Professor Karl N. Llewellyn as Chief Reporter. Other articles of the Code cover
Commercial Paper, Bank Collections and Foreign Banking, Investment Instruments,
Documents of Title, and Secured Commercial Transactions. Professors Llewellyn and
Soia Mentschikoff are reporters for the Revised Sales Act. The Revised Sales Act,
and drafts of other articles have been published in a single booklet. THE CODE OF
COMMERCIAL LAW (1948) (Copyright 1948; sections of the Revised Sales Act are
quoted with permission of the American Law Institute).
67. REVISED SALEs AcT §90(a).
68. REVISED SALES AcT § 77(1). On "cure" in present law, see Note, 31 COL.
L. REv. 1005 (1931); Cf. RVISED SAILs AcT § 77(2) (cure within time specified
for performance).
69. Cf. REVISED SALES AcT §§ 97(1), 101(a). The value of seller's performance
would be impaired by a market decline during the delay after the contract date, or by
pressing needs for the goods during that interval.
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tion to accept, rather than adherence to a simply stated and sweeping
rule of rejection."0
Permission to "cure" a defective delivery is not a complete an-
swer to the problem. Although this device will be highly useful where
seller and buyer are near each other or where substitute goods may
readily be purchased in buyer's market, if a long shipment is involved
the seller will find it difficult to effect a prompt and perfect "cure"
after rejection by the buyer at the point of destination. The circum-
stances which will measure "reasonable time" for a second tender are
not defined, but presumably the Revised Act does not overturn present
rulings that a fluctuating market price forecloses any substantial
delay.71  It thus appears that the section would seldom be of help to
a distant seller during a falling market-the very time when rejection
by the buyer on insubstantial grounds is most likely.72
Acceptance. The Revised Act again qualifies its rule of rejec-
tion in the case of a defect in performance which appears after "ac-
ceptance" of the- goods. In this event, the goods (and consequent
losses from market declines) may be forced back upon the seller only
if the defect "substantially impairs" their value.73  This, it will be
remembered, is a departure from the present statute which allows
"rescission", as well as rejection, for any breach of warranty.
This change from the present rule also appears to be sound.
Certainly there are strong reasons for relaxing the strict rule of re-
jection where goods have reached a late point in the process of dis-
tribution. Under most mercantile contracts, the goods will not have
been "accepted" until after they have reached the buyer's place of
70. The buyer's hazard is further reduced by a further bold stroke in Section 110
of the Revised Sales Act, which substantially curtails the seller's right to recover the
full price, as distinguished from damages. Under the Revised Act, the primary test
for liability to pay the price is "acceptance," and thus breaks from the rule of Sec-
tions 19(4) (2), 46(1) and 63(1) of the Uniform Sales Act, under which the buyer
may become liable for the full price when goods are delivered to a carrier. With
seller's claim reduced to actual damage, rather than the full price, the consequences
of a wrong decision by the buyer are substantially minimized. But cf. REVISED SALES
ACT § 110(1) (b), UNIFORm SALES AT § 63(3) (action for price for goods not reason-
ably subject to resale).
71. See 3 WILLISTO N, CONTRACTS § 854.
72. Some of the problems arising from technical mishap in shipment are met by
provisions that if the "agreed manner of delivery" becomes "commercially imprac-
ticable," the seller must tender, and the buyer must accept a "commercially reasonable
substitute." REVISED SALES ACT § 86(1). This provision expressly includes failure
of agreed berthing, loading or unloading facilities and unavailability of an agreed
type of carrier. Cf. id. § 86(2) (failure of agreed means of payment).
73. REVISED SALES ACT § 97. The proposed act is here dealing with the remedy
which it terms "revocation of acceptance," which is the analogue of "rescission" under
the present statute. UNIFORM SALES ACT § 69(1) (d).
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business.7" To upset the transfer of goods for trivial defects at this
late stage results in unnecessary expense and waste in distribution.
In addition, late action enhances the possibility that unfavorable mar-
ket changes have intervened, and places the seller in an awkward
evidentiary position in coping with the possibility that defects in the
goods arose (or were created) after their receipt by the buyer.
But the very fact that "acceptance" usually occurs at a late stage
in the sales transaction curtails the usefulness of this provision. The
rule does not fully follow the reasons which have been suggested in
its support, since goods may reach a late stage of distribution through
extended manufacture or long shipment, and may come into the buyer's
possession without "acceptance." This provision thus leaves ample
room for an alert buyer to find a technical defect in performance be-
fore he accepts; although unquestionably sound, it does not carry the
seller far beyond the protection which the present statute gives him
against late objections."
"Good faith" and commercial practice. Counsel facing litigation
will be intrigued to find in the Revised Act the admonition that every
sales contract "imposes an obligation of good faith in its perform-
ance." 76 The precise scope intended for this provision is not apparent.
But its language is sufficiently vague to invite the argument that a
rejection in a falling market was engendered by an ulterior motive to
avoid the price decline and therefore was not made in "good faith."
This new legal tool may be used to good effect to bar untoward
rejection. But it gives little aid in determining whether in any specific
case rejection is an appropriate remedy. In its customary setting in
problems of bona fide purchase, a concept such as "good faith" is
necessary, and reasonably workable.7 7  In dealing with the propriety
of rejection, however, a legal test framed in terms of the buyer's state
74. The definition of "acceptance," in Section 95 of the Revised Sales Act is not
wholly clear; the difficulty is enhanced by the elliptical rule that "(1) Acceptance of
goods occurs when the buyer (a) signifies his acceptance to the seller." The Revised
Act strongly suggests, but does not plainly state, that acts which under the present
Act would constitute "assent" to "appropriation" (such as authorization to ship) are
not "acceptance" unless they indicate judgment that the specified goods are satis-
factory. Compare REvIsED SALES AcT § 97(1) (b) with UNIFORM SALES AcT § 47(1)
(no acceptance until a reasonable opportunity for examination). This is one of the
points at which the Revised Act could well be clarified by modification or by explana-
tion in the Official Joint Comments.
75. UNIFORm SALES AcT § 69(3) (no rescission if buyer "knew of the breach of
warranty when he accepted" or fails to give notice within a reasonable time). Cf. id.
8815(3), 49.
76. REVISED SALES AcT § 26(2).
77. UNIFORM SALES AcT §§ 24, 25; REVISED SALES AcT §§ 57, 59. In problems
of bona fide purchase, the question of "good faith" will usually turn on the reasonably
tangible issue as to the buyer's access to information concerning a defect in his
transferor's title.
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of mind is much more elusive. Presumably a rejection of goods which
were seriously defective would not be held improper on evidence that
the buyer was aware of a market decline and was delighted to have
an avenue of escape from the purchase. In this field, less subjective
tests are needed. These may be found in the interests of the parties
which have already been isolated. Tangible tests are also available in
normal commercial practice. Here the Revised Act moves in a more
sure-footed manner in encouraging courts to refer to "usages of the
trade" and "commercial standards." 78
The "installment" rule. Still another refinement appears in a
special rule which curtails rejection in "installment contracts"; in these
transactions the buyer is subject to the duty to accept deliveries in
spite of a breach of warranty, unless the non-conformity "substantially
impairs the value of the installment." 7'
Through this provision, the Revised Act retreats on a broad front
from its own strict rule of rejection. The result may be welcomed by
one who favors a general rule of substantial performance. However,
the reasons for this distinction, which makes the right of rejection turn
on whether a contract of sale is to be performed singly or in install-
ments, are less than self-evident. If separate shipments under a single
contract are dependent on each other for full value or use (such as
separate parts of a single machine) there would be good reason to
limit the buyer's right to reject only one of the shipments. But this
is a problem of limited scope, and quite appropriately has been given
separate handling in the Revised Act." Also peculiar to installment
contracts is the question whether a defect on one delivery is so serious
that the buyer may repudiate the contract and reject future deliveries
78. REVISED SALEs ACT §§ 21, 26(1). Under Section 21(2) a "usage of trade"
is binding if "currently recognized as established in a particular place," a test which
may be employed to enlarge current restrictive rulings as to "custom." See note 39
supra. Cf. REVISED SALES ACT § 15(a) (parol evidence rule does not bar proof,
unless "contradicted" by contract).
79. REviSED SALES AcT § 101. This section provides:
(1) An installment contract is one which requires or authorizes the delivery of
goods in separate lots to be separately accepted and paid for, even though the contract
contains a clause "each delivery is a separate contract" or its equivalent.
(2) The buyer may reject any installment which is non-conforming if the non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured or
if the non-conformity is a defect in the required documents; but if the non-conformity
does not fall within paragraph (a) and the seller gives adequate assurance of its cure
the buyer must accept that installment. . . . (The reference to "paragraph (a)" is a
drafting error, presumably to be corrected, which resulted from merging paragraphs
labeled "(a)" and "(b)" in an earlier draft with paragraph (2). The apparent
meaning is: "if the non-conformity does not fall within this paragraph.")
80. Acceptance of part of any "commercial unit" is acceptance of the "entire
unit"; and "revocation of acceptance" is limited to "lots" and "commercial units" and
then only if non-conformity "substantially impairs" value. REVISED SALES ACT
§§ 95(2), 97. Nor would reasons based on the difficulty of separating shipments
apply to the first installment.
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in spite of their conformity to the contract. This latter problem also
demands a flexible rule, which is embodied in both the present and
proposed statutes.81
One might suppose that some clue to the reason for this special
rule could be found in its scope, as expressed in the statutory definition
of an "installment contract." But this is the very point at which the
Revised Act proves most troublesome. The installment contract is
defined as "one which requires or authorizes the delivery of goods in
separate lots to be separately accepted and paid for . . " 82 A
literal reading can not be given to this language, for it seems to say
that separate payment for each delivery is a necessary criterion of
the "installment" contract. It would be startling to conclude that the
special rules which apply because separate deliveries are embraced by
a single contract may not also apply when the deliveries are even more
closely linked by common payment.8 3 The concept of "separate pay-
ment" for each installment calls for clarification, but the transaction
which most plainly falls within this language is the contract requiring
cash on delivery. This, however, is the very transaction where de-
parture by the seller from the contract is least to be tolerated, for any
deficiency in the value of the delivery would force the buyer to trust
the seller's credit for a refund. At the very least, this definition of
the "installment contract" should be redrafted. If that step is not
taken courts will be forced to cut through its language to avoid the
absurdity of holding that the principles applicable to installment con-
tracts depend on "separate payment" for each delivery."
The search for some explanation of the separate rule for "in-
stallment" contracts leads us finally to the suggestion in the writings
of one of the draftsmen that "standing relations" warrant separate
81. UNIFORM SALES AcT § 45 (right to repudiate "depends in each case on the
terms of the contract and the circumstances of the case"); REVISED SALES ACT
§ 101 (3) (test is whether breach "substantially impairs the value of the whole con-
tract"). Cf. SALE OF GOODS AcT §31(2) (more rigid rule employing "repudiation"
as the test).
82. REVISED SALES AcT § 101(1), note 79 supra.
83. For example, it could hardly have been intended to exclude a contract calling
for a series of deliveries but a single payment from the benefit of Section 101(3),
which provides that a breach which "substantially impairs the value of the whole
contract" will justify repudiation of future shipments.
84. Incongruity is avoided by reading Section 101(1) to define an "installment
contract" as one which calls for the delivery of goods in separate lots to be separately
accepted "although the lots are to be separately paid for or although there is a clause
in the contract that each delivery is a separate contract or its equivalent." If Section
101(1) is redrafted, the error in Section 101(2) should be removed at the same time.
See note 79 supra.
The confusing emphasis upon separate payment apparently arises from attention
to the distinct problem whether the buyer is required to make piecemeal payment in
advance of complete delivery. Cf. REVIs ED SALEs AcT § 31; UNIFORM SALES AcT
§ 45(1).
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handling from "single-occasion deals." 85 For many purposes, this
distinction is inescapable: for example, a defective shipment may
justify rejection of that shipment, but not repudiation of a long-term
contract; past transactions may supply a "course of dealing" which
will shed light upon the parties' expectations; and the fact that further
shipments are expected may make it reasonable for the buyer to wait
for "cure" of shortages in the shipment. But these are all problems
which call for and have appropriately been given separate handling in
the Revised Act."6
Moreover, it does not appear that the existence of a "continuing
relationship" bears on the interests which support the right of rejec-
tion; the need to avoid credit strain or an uncertain measure of dam-
ages may be present regardless of other transactions between seller
and buyer. Nor does the "installment" rule necessarily fit the well-
established business relationship. The Act would apparently apply
a more strict test to deliveries to an old customer who repeatedly
places an order for single delivery than to a new contract between
distant and unacquainted parties which divides delivery into two or
more installments. Finally, this portion of the Revised Act violates
the sound canon of draftsmanship that the rule should "bear its reason
on its face." The lack of an apparent reason for this rule is likely
to result in difficult and formal disputes over the question whether,
for present purposes, a contract should fall within the "installment"
category. *
The "documentary" exception. In a further respect this same
provision of the Revised Act speaks in an uncertain voice, for even
in "installment" sales the right of rejection automatically follows if
there is a "defect in the required documents." s1 This qualification,
when read in context, means that if there is such a "defect," the
buyer may reject even though there is no "substantial impairment" of
the value of the installment.
The effect of this return to the strict rule is minimized by the
fact it will often be possible promptly to "cure" a "defect" in docu-
ments. 8 Moreover, such a defect is often a serious matter which
readily justifies rejection. It has already been noted that in any cash
transaction, typified by the exchange of shipping documents for a
draft, the buyer should not be required to undertake the credit hazard
involved in paying the full price subject to a later claim for refund.
85. See Llewellyn, Of Warranty of Quality, and Society 37 CoL. L. REv. 341,
375-8 (1937).
86. REVISED SALES AcT §§ 101 (3), 21, 22, 77.
87. REVISED SALES ACT §101(2), note 79 supra.
88. REVISED SALES AcT § 77. See text at note 68 supra.
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There are other strong reasons why documents should be fair on their
face, so that they may be readily marketable for pledge or resale be-
fore arrival of the goods.8" But even under the less rigid rule of
"substantial impairment" which the Revised Act provides for other
"installment" deliveries, courts may be expected to continue to recog-
nize these interests. The difficulty with the Act's special emphasis
upon strict compliance in the "documentary" field is that it may
jeopardize the results of recent cases which have barred rejection
based on trivial defects which did not impair the full value or salability
of the shipment." And, as the cases illustrate, sellers in a "docu-
mentary" transaction often have a particularly strong interest in ac-
ceptance, since heavy freight charges may have accrued in shipping to




It is evident that the Revised Sales Act will mark a further
significant step in the evolution of the law of conditions in sales con-
tracts. Viewed as a whole, this development forms an instructive
pattern of action, reaction, and adjustment. From early cases hold-
ing parties to their promises regardless of failure of the expected
return, the law made its way through an intermediate position in
the formal and technical rules of the British statute to the opposite
extreme in the strict rule of rejection of the Uniform Sales Act.
Case-law and mercantile practice then became restive under this
regime and pressures developed which are now finding outlet in the
delicate adjustments which the Revised Act proposes.
This partial return towards strengthening the obligation of ac-
ceptance is to be welcomed. The Revised Act has found a number
of means to this end without seriously impairing the buyer's protect-
tion against breach of the sales contract. It appears unfortunate, how-
ever, that the draftsmen of the Revised Act have not found the way
89. See note 46 vtpra.
90. Cases cited in notes 47, 48 supra. Sellers may counter with the contention
that an immaterial deviation is not a "defect," and invoke the provisions already dis-
cussed, on "good faith," "commercial standards," and "usage." REvISED SALES AcT
§§ 10, 21; cf. id. § 37(1) (affirmation and promises are warranties only if "part of
the bargain").
91. A number of the difficult "documentary" cases have involved long shipments
of raw staples, where price fluctuations are particularly severe. E. g., Dixon, Irmaos
& Cia v. Chase National Bank, 144 F. 2d 759 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U. S.
850 (1945) (sugar for Belgium-war intervened); Lamborn v. National Bank of
Commerce, 276 U. S. 469 (1928) (sugar from Java-post-war price panic); Filley
v. Pope, 115 U. S. 213 (1885), and Norrington v. Wright. 115 U. S. 188 (1885)
(iron from Scotland-price drop).
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open to seize a somewhat bolder and less complex course, by con-
ferring the right to reject only for a "material" breach by the seller,
9 2
subject to guides to the materiality of the breach in terms of the in-
terests of seller and buyer which we have isolated. Although the
Revised Act provides a wide assortment of tools for reaching the
result either of rejection or acceptance there is some .danger that the
significant interests of the parties may be lost among thesd over-
lapping rules.
One may hazard the suggestion that the draftsmen, acutely aware
of the part which neat factual distinctions have played in the growth
of case-law," have at this point strained a bit too hard to place these
distinctions into permanent statutory form. These sections of the
Revised Sales Act, therefore, present a larger problem, which can
only be suggested here, concerning the degree of detail for which
legislative draftsmen should strive.
As Justice Cardozo has told us, we may "worry overmuch about
the enduring consequences of our errors," for there is a process which
"silently and steadily effaces our mistakes and eccentricities." " But
this reassurance was concerned with the judicial rather than the
legislative process, where errors have a more stubborn existence. Of
course, where the draftsman clearly sees a vision of the law as it
should be, he can and should construct with sharp and detailed lines.
However, in dealing with a problem such as substantial performance
in sales contracts, where the presence of a number of variable factors
tends to blur formal distinctions, it seems wise to give wider scope
to further development in case-law.95
The Revised Act, as it now stands, provides a partial answer to
the problems raised by its highly-refined provisions. One of its most
novel and, it is believed, one of its most wholesome provisions is a
self-denying rule of statutory construction. The Revised Act invites
courts to look through its language to "underlying reasons, purposes
and policies" and, in addition, authorizes the expansion of any
92. Compare the rule preserved for Scotland in Section 11(2) of the Sale of
Goods Act. For leeway in continental sales law see Rabel, A Draft of an Inter-
national Law of Sales, 5 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 543, 548, 552, 556 (1938).
93. Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 37 CoL. L. REv. 341, 381
(1937).
94. CARDozo, NATURE OF THIE JUDICIAL PRocEss 179 (1921).
95. Cf. Gilmore, On the Dfficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE L. J.
1341, 1355 (1948).
It must be added that examination of the problem of rejection gives far from a
fair picture of the skill employed in building most of the other provisions of this
proposed statute. Although improvement seems possible in the handling of rejection,
particularly with respect to the "installment" distinction, it may be appropriate to
note that I should have little hesitation in moving the adoption of the Revised Act
as a whole.
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"limited" rule when "circumstances and underlying reasons justify
extending its application." 96
Such a self-limiting rule of construction must, it seems, be born
of a proper feeling of humility on the part of any draftsman as to his
ability to put into words the rules which will do justice in the infinite
combinations of facts which may arise under the statute. Given this
mandate, courts which may find no clear answer to the problem of
rejection from the interplay of the rules of the Act may be invited
to give effect to the thrust of legislative policy towards enhancing the
obligation of acceptance, subject to alert concern for the interests of
the buyer which are served by the remedy of rejection.
96. REVISED SALEs AcT §§ 1(1), 1(3).
